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Abstract
We consider a general scheme to construct Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms using a suitable ‘variable mechanism
parametrization.’ The key idea is to perturb a given direct mechanism, which might not be truth revealing, introducing sufficient
variability as a function of agents’ announcements to generate incentives for truthful revelation. We discuss a variable-price auction
in a general setting as an example.
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Let the will be set on the Way.
Confucius (K’ung fu-tzu) (551–479 bc).1
1. Introduction
Multi-agent mechanism design has proved useful for the implementation of allocation rules in many diverse settings,
such as public decision making, multilateral trade, or the distribution of resources within a firm. A standard approach
to mechanism design uses the revelation principle (Gibbard, 1973; Myerson, 1979), which allows limiting attention to
direct mechanisms,2 subject to Bayesian incentive-compatibility constraints which guarantee that truthfully announcing
private type information to the principal (who then makes a resource-allocation decision based on all announcements
received) is an undominated strategy for all agents participating in the mechanism. Real-world mechanisms, on the
other hand, typically are neither direct nor do they induce truthful revelation of private information. This may be due
to a lack of design (i.e., bounded rationality), to institutional limitations (which hamper the consideration of certain
agent heterogeneities), or, perhaps, to a conscious effort by the mechanism designer to strongly implement a particular
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 650 725 6827.
E-mail addresses: webert@stanford.edu (T.A. Weber), abapna@google.com (A. Bapna).
1 Analects 7.6.
2 A direct mechanism is such that an agent’s possible announcements must come from the set that contains this agent’s private type information
(i.e., his type space).
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social welfare function, circumventing certain undesirable equilibria introduced by applying the revelation principle
(Palfrey, 2002). Whatever the reason may be, we start from the premise that existing mechanisms are at least somewhat
flexible and contain parameters that can be adjusted. The question we then address is how to systematically use the
available ﬂexibility in existing mechanisms in order to achieve Bayesian incentive compatibility. The central idea is to
use an announcement-contingent parameter vector, which may be different for each agent (depending on observable
heterogeneities). The parameter-induced systematic change in the agents’ payoffs as a function of their announcements
may be used to provide the missing incentives for truthful revelation of their private information. This approach is rather
general: for instance, when using the parameters to establish a homotopy relation between certain ‘extreme’ mechanisms
(which provide ‘extreme’ incentives), it is often possible to interpret our method as an announcement-contingent
randomization of mechanisms,3 which may prove exceedingly useful in complex environments, e.g., when designing
efficient dynamic allocation mechanisms (Bapna and Weber, 2005).4 A key notion we use to characterize ‘extreme’
incentives is one-sided (upward/downward) Bayesian incentive compatibility, expressing the fact that agents either
never under- or never over-report their types to the principal under a given mechanism. Providing a general framework
to combine such one-sided mechanisms, or, more generally, perturbing a non-incentive-compatible mechanism to yield
truthful mechanisms is the essential contribution of this paper. We illustrate our approach by constructing a truthful
variable-price auction in a general asymmetric common-values setting.
2. The model
2.1. Preliminaries
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 agents and one mechanism-designing principal. An agent i∈N = {1, . . . , n} is of type
θi ∈Θi = [θi, ¯θi], where θi and ¯θi are finite real numbers with θi < ¯θi. The agents’ types are jointly distributed on Θ. At
the start of the game each agent i privately observes his own type θi, which determines his utility Ui((ξ, τ); θi) for any
l-bundle of commodities ξ ∈Rl+ (where l ≥ 1 is an integer) and any monetary transfer τ ∈R to the principal. We assume
that for any i∈N the utility function Ui(·; θi) : Rl+ × R → R is smooth on Rl+ × R and is smoothly parameterized on
Θi.
Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be an allocation rule, where for each i∈N the function αi = (xi, ti) is such that xi : Θ → Rl
maps a type vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) in Θ to an l-bundle of commodities xi(θ) in Rl+, while ti : Θ → R maps θ to
a real-valued transfer payment ti(θ) from agent i to the principal.5 We assume that the principal is able to commit
to an allocation rule α which is known to all agents, before each agent i makes a type announcement ˆθi ∈Θi to the
principal, who then ensures that the allocation α(ˆθ) with ˆθ = (ˆθ1, . . . , ˆθn) takes place. This sequential allocation game
corresponds to a direct mechanismM = 〈α,Θ〉 in which the space of possible agent announcements coincides with
the type space Θ. The revelation principle ensures that restricting attention to such mechanisms is without loss of
generality, as long as the allocation function is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) in the sense that
∀θi ∈Θi : θi ∈ arg max
ˆθi ∈Θi
¯Ui(ˆθi, θi), (1)
where
¯Ui(ˆθi, θi) = Eθ−i [Ui(αi(ˆθi, ˜θ−i); θi)|θi] (2)
denotes agent i’s expected utility conditional on truthful announcements by other agents (given his beliefs about
their random types ˜θ−i), for all ˆθi, θi ∈Θi. While agent i’s expected utility ¯Ui clearly depends on the allocation
rule αi, we choose to not explicitly acknowledge this dependency on the left-hand side of (2). The reasons for this
3 The idea of randomized mechanisms is not new and dates back at least to Myerson (1981).
4 We limit attention to Bayesian implementation (Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1986; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1993). When agents’ utilities are quasi-
linear, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility can be implemented without budget balance through Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanisms (Vickrey,
1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), and Bayesian incentive compatibility can be implemented with budget balance through d’Aspremont–Ge´rard-
Varet–Arrow (AGV–Arrow) mechanisms (Arrow, 1979; d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1979). In the absence of quasilinearity this is generically
not possible, regardless of budget balance.
5 We introduce the principal to ensure budget balance, even when utilities are not quasilinear (so that the AGV–Arrow mechanism offers no
remedy).
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are that (i) the function αi remains fixed throughout the paper, and that (ii) we like to emphasize an announcement-
dependent reparametrization of the original allocation rule which is introduced as follows: consider a direct mechanism
M(η¯) = 〈(α1(· ; η¯1), . . . , αn(·; η¯n)),Θ〉 whose allocation function depends on the value of a parameter matrix η¯ =
[η¯ik](i,k) ∈N×M, where M = {1, . . . , m} and m ≥ 2 is an integer that denotes the number of parameters per agent.6
Then, for any given η¯ = (η¯i1, . . . , η¯im), agent i’s set of optimal announcements is
Ai(θi; η¯i) = arg max
ˆθi ∈Θi
¯Ui(ˆθi, θi; η¯i),
so that Bayesian incentive compatibility is equivalent to the inclusion θi ∈Ai(θi; η¯i) for all θi ∈Θi and all i∈N.
Assume now that the principal, instead of fixing a parameter matrix η¯ at the outset, makes the ith row vector which
we term ηi = (ηi1, . . . , ηim) of a matrix η = [ηik](i,k) ∈N×M dependent on agent i’s announcement, i.e.,
ηi = ηi(ˆθi).
This includes the special case of a ﬁxed parametrization with ηi(ˆθi) ≡ η¯i discussed above.
Deﬁnition 1 (Fixed/variable parametrization). For each i∈N let Ei ⊂ Rm be a locally path connected topological
space and let E = E1 × · · · × En. The mechanism parametrizationM(η) with η = (η1, . . . , ηn) is called a fixed mech-
anism parametrization (on E) if the mapping ηi : Θi → Ei is constant with ηi(ˆθi) ≡ η¯i ∈Rm for all i∈N. Otherwise
it is called a variable mechanism parametrization (on E).
Thus, instead of the parameterized mechanismM(η¯) for a fixed parameter, the principal offers the mechanismM(η)
for a variable parameter, so that Bayesian incentive compatibility amounts to
θi ∈Ai(θi; ηi) = arg max
ˆθi ∈Θi
¯Ui(ˆθi, θi; ηi(ˆθi)) (3)
for all θi ∈Θi and all i∈N.
2.2. Statement of the problem
Using the terminology in Definition 1, we are interested in conditions under which for a given fixed mechanism
parametrization M(η¯) on E that does not need to be BIC, a variable mechanism parametrization M(η), containing
the mapping η : Θ → E, can be found that is BIC. We refer to this question as problem (P). To deal with the agents’
participation constraint (requiring that ¯Ui(θi, θi, η¯i) ≥ ¯Ui0(θi) for some smooth expected reservation utility ¯Ui0 : Θi →
R), we assume in what follows that the parameter domain E ⊂ Rm is (i) nonempty, (ii) locally path connected, and
(iii) individually rational with respect to (U1, . . . , Un) in the sense that
η¯∈E ⇒ ( ¯U1(θ1, θ1; η¯1) − ¯U10 (θ1), . . . , ¯Un(θn, θn; η¯n) − ¯Un0 (θn)) ≥ 0 (4)
for all θ ∈Θ.
2.3. Bayesian incentive compatibility
To address problem (P) it is useful to first relax the concept of Bayesian incentive compatibility and express it for
any agent i∈N with respect to a single-valued measurable selection σi(θi) ∈Ai(θi).
Deﬁnition 2 (One-sided Bayesian incentive compatibility). Let M be a direct mechanism. (i) The mechanism
M is downward (upward) Bayesian incentive compatible, in short d-BIC (u-BIC), with respect to a selection
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) if for any i∈N and any θi ∈Θi we have that
σi(θi) ≥ (≤)θi. (5)
6 The requirement that m ≥ 2 is without loss of generality, since the dependence of the mechanism on ηi
k
for k ≥ 2 can be trivial for any i∈N.
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(ii) The mechanismM is downward (upward) incentive compatible if it is d-BIC (u-BIC) with respect to any selection
σ ∈A. (iii) The mechanismM is one-sided if it is either d-BIC or u-BIC.
Lemma 1 (BIC). A direct mechanismM is BIC if and only if there exists a selection σ ∈A such thatM is both d-BIC
and u-BIC with respect to σ.
Proof. BIC implies by (1) both d-BIC and u-BIC. The converse is true, since θi ≤ σi(θi) ≤ θi implies that σi(θi) =
θi ∈Ai(θi) for all i∈N and all θi ∈Θi. 
We provide a characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility which is adapted to our context and then, using
an approach similar to the one in Weber (2005), derive a ‘sufficient BIC criterion’ which proves useful in finding a
variable mechanism parametrization that is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Lemma 2 (Equivalent BIC criterion). The parameterized mechanismM(η) is BIC if and only if 7
∂ ¯Ui
∂ˆθi
∣∣∣∣(θi,θi;ηi(θi)) +
∂ ¯Ui
∂ηi
∣∣∣∣(θi,θi;ηi(θi)) · η˙i(θi) = 0 (6)
and
(ˆθi − θi)
(
∂ ¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(ˆθi,θi;ηi(ˆθi)) −
∂ ¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(θi,θi;ηi(θi))
)
≥ 0. (7)
Proof. ⇒: If M(η) is BIC, then relation (3) implies, by Fermat’s rule, condition (6) for all θ ∈ intΘ, so that, by
continuity of the left-hand side, condition (6) is satisfied for all θ ∈Θ. This implies that the total derivative
d ¯Ui(θi, θi; ηi(θi))
dθi
= ∂
¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(θi,θi;ηi(θi)),
whence we obtain, by the fundamental theorem of calculus (Rudin,1976, p. 134), that
¯Ui(ˆθi, ˆθi; ηi(ˆθi)) − ¯Ui(θi, θi; ηi(θi)) =
∫ ˆθi
θi
∂ ¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(ϑ,ϑ;ηi(ϑ))dϑ
for all ˆθi, θi ∈Θi and all i∈N. Again, by the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have that
¯Ui(ˆθi, ˆθi; ηi(ˆθi)) − ¯Ui(ˆθi, θi; ηi(ˆθi)) =
∫ ˆθi
θi
∂ ¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(ˆθi,ϑ;ηi(ϑ))dϑ
for all ˆθi, θi ∈Θi and all i∈N. Since BIC ofM(η) is equivalent to
¯Ui(θi, θi; ηi(θi)) ≥ ¯Ui(ˆθi, θi; ηi(ˆθi)), (8)
we find that∫ ˆθi
θi
[
∂ ¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(ˆθi,ϑ;ηi(ˆθi)) −
∂ ¯Ui
∂θi
∣∣∣∣(ϑ,ϑ;ηi(ϑ))
]
dϑ ≥ 0
for all ˆθi, θi ∈Θi and all i∈N. The last inequality holds if and only if condition (7) is satisfied. ⇐: From our earlier
arguments we obtain directly that conditions (6) and (7) together imply (8), i.e., the Bayesian incentive compatibility
ofM(η). 
7 For notational convenience, we use dots to indicate total derivatives.
398 T.A. Weber, A. Bapna / Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008) 394–403
Corollary 1 (Sufficient BIC criterion). The parameterized mechanismM(η) is BIC if for every i∈N condition (6)
holds on Θi and
Gi(ˆθi, ηi(ˆθi), η˙i(ˆθi)) ≥ 0 (9)
for all ˆθi ∈Θi, where
Gi(ˆθi, η¯i, ν) = min
θi ∈Θi
{
∂2 ¯Ui
∂ˆθi∂θi
∣∣∣∣(ˆθi,θi;η¯i) +
∂2 ¯Ui
∂θi∂ηi
∣∣∣∣(ˆθi,θi;η¯i) · ν
}
(10)
for all (ˆθi, η¯i, ν) ∈Θi × Ei × Rm.
Note that the single-crossing condition (7) is not particularly useful in practice, so that we limit attention to the
sufficient condition (9) which implies (7). If the agents’ expected utilities are supermodular in announcements and
types, this is also without any loss in generality.
3. Main result
Let us first introduce the control variable ui = (ui1, . . . , uim) = (η˙i1, . . . , η˙im). To state our results in a concise way it is
convenient to assume that ¯Ui(ˆθi, θi; ηi) is strictly increasing in ηi1.8 We can then rewrite the sufficient implementability
conditions (6) and (9) from Corollary 1 in the form
η˙i(θi) = ϕi(θi, ηi(θi), ui−1), (11)
ui−1(θi) ∈Ui−1(θi, ηi(θi)), (12)
for all θi ∈Θi and i∈N, where ui−1 = (ui2, . . . , uim),
ϕi(θi, η¯i, ui−1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−
(
∂ ¯Ui
∂ηi1
∣∣∣∣
(θi,θi;η¯i)
)−1 (
∂ ¯Ui
∂ˆθi
∣∣∣∣(θi,θi;η¯i) +
m∑
k=2
∂ ¯Ui
∂ηik
∣∣∣∣
(θi,θi;η¯i)
uik
)
ui2
.
.
.
uim
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (13)
and
Ui−1(θi, η¯i) = {uˆi−1 ∈Rm−1 : Gi(θi, η¯i, ϕi(θi, η¯i, uˆi−1)) ≥ 0} (14)
for all (θi, η¯i, ui−1) ∈Θi × Ei × Rm−1.
Theorem 1. Let η¯d, η¯u ∈E. The variable mechanism parametrizationM(η) is BIC if the following three conditions
are satisﬁed: (C1) the ﬁxed mechanism parametrization M(η¯d) is d-BIC; (C2) the ﬁxed mechanism parametriza-
tion M(η¯u) is u-BIC; and (C3) for any i∈N the system (11) can be steered from ηi(θi) = η¯iu to ηi(¯θi) = η¯id using
ui−1(θi) ∈Ui−1(θi, ηi(θi)) such that ηi(θi) ∈Ei for all θi ∈Θi.
Proof. By Definition 2, for any selection σi(θi) ∈Ai(θi; η¯id) we have that agent i’s optimal announcement ˆθi = σi(θi)
is not less than his type θi for almost all θi ∈Θi. Hence, at the upper end of the type interval Θi it is σi(¯θi) = ¯θi, i.e.,
any agent i of type ¯θi announces truthfully under the mechanismM(η¯d). Similarly, any agent i of type θi announces
truthfully under the mechanismM(η¯u). The differential Eq. (11) is equivalent to condition (6) (since (η˙i1, . . . , η˙im) =
(ui1, . . . , uim)), and the inclusion η˙i(θi) ∈Ui−1(θi, ηi(θi)) is equivalent to condition (7). 
8 All we need is that relation (6), ∂ ¯Ui/∂ˆθi + ∂ ¯Ui/∂ηi · (ui1, . . . , uim) = 0, can be solved for ui1 (or, without loss of generality, for any other single
component of ui) almost everywhere on Θi.
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Theorem 1 requires that the stateηi(θi) of the system described by (11) can be steered fromηi(θi) = η¯id toηi(¯θi) = η¯iu,
subject to the constraint (12) and the state constraint ηi(θi) ∈Ei. Consider now agent i. If any other agent j follows a
truthful announcement strategy, then it is clear that either starting or ending the trajectory at a one-sided mechanism,
subject to the last two constraints, is enough to guarantee the Bayesian incentive compatibility of the parametrization
M(η). We can thus strengthen Theorem 1.
Theorem 1′. Let η¯d, η¯u ∈E. The variable mechanism parametrizationM(η) is BIC if, in addition to (C3), either (C1)
or (C2) in Theorem 1 is satisﬁed.
The last theorem states that if a parameter path η(θ) either starts or ends at a point η¯∈E at which the mechanism
M(η¯) is one-sided, then the variable mechanism parametrizationM(η) is BIC. One-sidedness at an endpoint is useful
in guaranteeing that all agents find it optimal there to report their types truthfully.
4. Application: truthful variable-price auctions
To illustrate our findings, let us consider a positive linear combination of m different k-price auctions (where
k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and m ≥ 3) in a general asymmetric common-values setting. Suppose that there are n ≥ m risk-averse
agents, jointly distributed on the full support Θ = Θ1 × · · · × Θn with smooth joint density f. To obtain convenient
stochastic ordering properties, we make the standard assumption that types are affiliated (Milgrom and Weber, 1982;
Karlin and Rinott, 1980), i.e., that f is log-supermodular. Consistent with (weak) risk aversion, we assume that for
any realization θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) of the random vector ˜θ = (˜θ1, . . . , ˜θn), any agent i’s utility Ui(·; θi) : R → R, where
θi ∈Θi = [θi, ¯θi] ⊂ R++, is a smooth concave function. The mechanism is parameterized such that the weight ηik on
the kth highest price for agent i is a mapping from Θi to nonnegative real numbers, so that any coefficient vector
ηi = (ηi1, . . . , ηim) is an element of
Ei = {η¯i ∈Rm+ : min
θi ∈Θi
¯Ui(θi, θi, η¯i) ≥ 0},
which is nonempty, locally path connected, and individually rational with respect to Ui, assuming that all agents’
reservation utility is zero.
We are now ready to construct a variable mechanism parametrization of this mechanism that is BIC. If all agents
other than agent i follow a truthful bidding strategy (so that ˆθj ≡ b(θj) ≡ θj for all j = i), agent i’s expected utility
from announcing ˆθi ∈Θi is9
¯Ui(ˆθi, θi; ηi) = P(˜θ(1) = ˆθi) E[Ui(ρi(ˆθi, θi, ˜θ; ηi); θi)∣∣ ˜θ(1) = ˆθi, ˜θi = θi],
where
ρi(ˆθi, θi, ˜θ; ηi) = θi − ηi1(ˆθi)ˆθi −
m∑
k=2
ηik(ˆθi)b(˜θ(k)).
For any i∈N, the implementability condition (6) then becomes∫
Θ−i
(
ηi1(θi) +
m∑
k=1
˜θ(k)η˙ik(θi)
)
˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; ηi); θi)f (˜θ|˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi) d˜θ−i = Ri(θi; ηi),
where
Ri(θi; ηi) =
¯Ui(θi, θi; ηi)
P(˜θ(1) = θi)
(
∂ ln P(˜θ(1) = θi)
∂θi
)
+
∫
Θ−i
Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; ηi); θi) ∂f (
˜θ|˜θ(1) = ˆθi, ˜θi = θi)
∂ˆθi
∣∣∣∣∣
ˆθi=θi
d˜θ−i
is the change of agent i’s expected utility in case of winning due to the effect a marginal increase of his announcement
has on the probability of winning. In equilibrium, the latter equals the marginal change of agent i’s payment to the
9 We denote by a(k) the kth largest element of a given vector a.
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principal. The last condition, together with inequality (9), is by Corollary 1 sufficient for BIC. Note that in our setting
for any η¯i ∈Ei and ν = (ν1, . . . , νm) ∈Rm we have that
Gi(ˆθi, η¯i, ν) = P(˜θ(1) = ˆθi) min
θi ∈Θi
{
E
[(
∂ ln P(˜θ(1) = ˆθi)
∂ˆθi
)
˙Ui(ρi; θi) − η¯i1 ¨Ui(ρi; θi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ˜θ(1) = ˆθi, ˜θi = θi
]
+
∫
Θ−i
˙Ui(ρi; θi) ∂f (
˜θ|˜θ(1) = ˆϑi, ˜θi = θi)
∂ ˆϑi
∣∣∣∣∣
ˆϑi=θi
d˜θ−i
−
m∑
k=1
νkE
[
˜θ(k) ¨Ui(ρi; θi)
∣∣∣ ˜θ(1) = ˆθi, ˜θi = θi]
}
where ρi = ρi(ˆθi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i). The evolution of ηi in the variable mechanism parametrization is governed by relations
(11) and (12), where
ϕi(θi, η¯i, ui−1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
− η¯
i
1
θi
−
Ri(θi; η¯i) −
m∑
k=2
uikE[˜θ(k) ˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)|˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi]
θiE[ ˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)|˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi]
ui2
.
.
.
uim
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (15)
If we set η¯iu = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and let η¯id ∈ Ei be free, then the fixed mechanism parametrization M(η¯iu) is u-BIC
(since a first-price auction is u-BIC, resulting in the familiar ‘bid shaving’). Thus, condition (C2) is satisfied. We
now check condition (C3), restricting attention to ‘controls’ ui−1 ∈Rm−1 such that u2 = · · · = um−1 = 0. Since f is
log-supermodular by assumption, the sum of the first two terms of the minimand in the definition of Gi is nonnegative.
Since E[(˜θ(1) − ˜θ(m)) ˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)|˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi] ≥ 0, the last term is nonnegative, as long as νm ≥ ν1. But
the previous inequality is satisfied if uim is larger than the first entry of ϕi (termed ϕi1, corresponding to ui1) in (15), or,
equivalently, if given η¯i and θi ∈Θi it is
uim(θi) ≥ −
η¯i1E[ ˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)|˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi] + Ri(θi; η¯i)
E[(˜θ(1) − ˜θ(m)) ˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)|˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi] ≡ u
i
m(θi, η¯i).
Hence, we can conclude using Theorem 1′ that, as long as the control-constraint
uim(θi) ≥ uim(θi, ηi(θi)) (16)
is satisfied on Θi, the variable mechanism parametrizationM(η) with{
η˙i(θi) = (ϕi1(θi, ηi(θi), (0, . . . , uim(θi))), 0, . . . , 0, uim(θi)),
ηi(θi) = η¯id,
(17)
for all i∈N and all θi ∈Θi, is BIC (cf. Fig. 1).10 Intuitively, by selecting a starting point η¯iu and an endpoint η¯id that are
in Ei and making sure that the trajectory never leaves Ei in between, individual rationality is satisfied by the definition
10 A solution ηi to the initial value problem (17) subject to ηi ∈Ei exists, since we can find a uim such that the parameter trajectory stays within the
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Fig. 1. Variable-price auction as a truthful variable mechanism parametrizationM(η) with ui−1 = (0, . . . , 0, uim) and ui1 = ϕi1(θi, η¯i, ui−1) for all
i∈N.
of Ei. The resulting mechanism is also incentive compatible, because the control constraint (16) can be satisfied on
the entire type space (cf. Footnote 10).
Remark. In the special case where all bidders are symmetric (so that Ui ≡ U), risk neutral (so that ˙U = 1 and
¨U = 0), and with independent private values (so that f (θ) = ∏ni=1 ˙F (θi) for some smooth cumulative distribution
function F defined on the common type interval [θ, ¯θ] ⊂ R++), we obtain that11G(ˆθi, η¯, ν) = ∂Fn−1(ˆθi)/∂ˆθi = (n −
1)Fn−2(ˆθi)f (ˆθi) ≥ 0, independent of η¯ and ν. As a result, only implementability constraint (6) needs to be satisfied,
which takes on the form(
θi −
m∑
k=1
ηkbk(θi)
)
∂ ln Fn−1(θi)
∂θi
=
m∑
k=1
(η˙kbk(θi) + ηk ˙bk(θi)),
where bk(θi) ≡
∫
Θ−i
˜θ(k)f (˜θ|˜θ(k) = ˜θi = θi) d˜θ−i is the expected kth highest announcement conditional on agent i’s
winning the auction.
In a setting with independent private values it is well known (Holt, 1980) that with risk-averse agents, revenue
equivalence breaks down and a principal prefers a first-price auction to a second-price auction (actually, to any k-price
auction for k ≥ 2). On the other hand, Monderer and Tennenholtz (2003) suggest that k-price auctions for k ≥ 3 may be
more desirable than first- and second-price auctions because of the agents’ risk-proneness. Clearly, in a common-values
setting the situation is more delicate, but in light of the above a combination of different k-price auctions k ∈ {1, . . . , m}
unit simplex (which is contained in Ei). The latter is satisfied as long as uim is such that −ϕi1 ≥ uim ≥ ϕi1 ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
uim(θi, ηi(θi)) ≤ uim(θi) ≤ u¯im(θi, ηi(θi)),
for all θi ∈Θi, where
uim(θi, η¯i) ≤ 0 ≤ u¯im(θi, η¯i) ≡ −
(
E
[(
˜θ(1) − ˜θ(m)
)
˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)
∣∣ ˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi]
E
[(
˜θ(1) + ˜θ(m)
)
˙Ui(ρi(θi, θi, ˜θ; η¯i); θi)
∣∣ ˜θ(1) = ˜θi = θi]
)
uim(θi, η¯i)
for all θi ∈Θi and all η¯i ∈Ei. Note also that η¯i1 = 0 implies that Ri = 0, which in turn implies that uim = 0, so that ηi(θi) must indeed lie in Ei for
all θi ∈Θi (i.e., the parameter trajectory cannot exit through the left boundary of Ei in Fig. 1).
11 Note that
∫
Θ−i ∂f (˜θ|˜θ(1) = ˆθi, ˜θi = θi)/∂ˆθi|ˆθi=θi d˜θ−i = ∂/∂ˆθiE[1|˜θ(1) = ˆθi, ˜θi = θi] ≡ 0.
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for some m ≥ 3 seems rather natural. Note that our results do not depend in any substantive way on the agents’ risk
preferences (nor on assumptions about the type distribution, except for smoothness). The substantial flexibility available
when choosing a parameter path that yields a truthful mechanism (cf. Fig. 1) can be used to achieve surplus distribution
objectives that the principal might have; Bapna and Weber (2005) show how this may be accomplished in a specific
dynamic mechanism design problem. The main idea for using a BIC mechanism parametrization to shift surplus from
the agents to the principal, or between agents, is to first determine an “ideal” parametrization that is individually rational
but not necessarily BIC so as to satisfy the revenue distribution objectives (e.g., revenue maximization, efficiency, or
fairness). Subsequently, one can approximate the trajectory of the ideal parametrization by a finite number of pieces
of BIC trajectories, thereby approaching the desired revenue objective up to a pre-specified error.
5. Conclusion
In existing mechanisms parameters often occur naturally and one-sided incentives can easily be induced by providing
extreme incentives. To understand what drives the BIC-parametrization idea in this paper it is best to consider Theorem
1′, which is a little stronger than Theorem 1. It asserts that when starting a mechanism parametrization at a point η¯ for
which the mechanismM(η¯) is one-sidedly BIC (either u-BIC or d-BIC), then the parametrization can be rendered BIC
by steering η(θ) away from the initial point η¯ (as a function of announcements), subject to satisfying the incentive-
compatibility constraints (11) and (12). What is important is that one starts with a one-sidedly BIC mechanism, and
then stays on a path which guarantees and maintains BIC. The key insight therefore is: in order to achieve Bayesian
incentive compatibility, it is mostly the direction of the parametrization that matters. Its absolute position is important
only insofar as it ensures that the mechanism along its path stays individually rational. The direction of the path
is chosen in terms of the control variable ui = (ui1, . . . , uim) = (η˙i1, . . . , η˙im) for each agent i∈N. As long as the
control-constraint set Ui−1(θi, ηi(θi)) is not empty along the chosen path, BIC can be established. Because of this local
approach, it is important that it is possible to vary the η(θ) in a neighborhood by selecting an appropriate slope through
the controls. When the type space is discrete, an equivalent BIC criterion cannot be written in the convenient format
of Lemma 2. Nonetheless, the basic idea should be translatable to a discrete type space, but the presentation would be
quite different and could not be integrated with the current exposition using continuous-time control concepts. From
a mathematical point of view, the question of being able to establish BIC or not is one about nonlinear controllability
given quite particular control constraints.
Our application of a variable-price auction illustrates the potential benefits of a systematic use of an announcement-
contingent mechanism parametrization. It becomes apparent from our analysis that there may be many such truthful
mechanism parametrizations, so that selecting the best one from the principal’s point of view is subject to further
optimization by the principal. Solving problem (P) can be considered an important step on the way to finding optimal
mechanisms.
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